As nuclear talks continue in Vienna, the game has only just begun
Indeed, for now, perhaps neither the Biden administration nor the Supreme Leader of Iran believe a mutually acceptable deal is possible. And it is unlikely that one of the parties – Iran, which appears to be using the talks as a cover to bolster its nuclear program – believes an accord is even desirable right now.
All of that means that the game is just getting started, and the outcome will be neither a quick one nor a downfall. Indeed, today the representatives of Iran presented their own documents on the lifting of sanctions and their own nuclear activities, offering to stay in Vienna to continue the negotiations. Instead, we are likely going to have to go through a protracted game of maneuvering and pressuring each side to get what they want, or not get it, to ensure that, if When negotiations go awry, the other side bears the lion’s share of the blame.
As a general rule, an impasse in negotiations will be broken when there are enough current levels of pain and benefit to change the parties’ calculus. As anyone who’s been involved in negotiations will tell you – whether it’s with Israelis, Palestinians or Russians – pressure and pain alone rarely work, especially when one country accepts see their vital interests at stake.
President Trump’s maximum pressure campaign on Iran is an example. The sanctions have severely damaged Iran’s economy, but they have not forced Iran to make concessions; in fact, Trump’s sanctions have resulted in Iran ramping up its nuclear program.
The challenge facing negotiations today is that the elements that led to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal are all missing. As U.S. Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley has noted, the combination of pressure and inducement that led to the previous agreement is no longer compatible.
Furthermore, the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the agreement; Iran violated the agreement by expanding its ability to enrich uranium, after initially complying with the treaty after the US abandoned it; additional US sanctions; Iran’s refusal to allow the IAEA to monitor sensitive nuclear sites has not only undermined the trust and confidence that exists, especially between the US and Iran; but also raises serious questions – with some key provisions to be terminated in 2025 – about whether the original agreement has become obsolete and no longer relevant.
Worse still, since the US withdrew from the agreement in 2018, the political situation on both sides has become significantly more difficult. A new, tougher Iranian government came to power in June and the Supreme Leader – clearly never a fan of the original accord – has now publicly acknowledged it was a mistake.
The surge in harsh criticism of the previous Rouhani government by a new foreign minister and the very process of a new, tougher negotiator has created a series of fanciful demands that Iran will difficult to amend or repeal without amendment. concessions from Washington.
For Americans, the Biden administration’s intention to rejoin the accord is complicated by the President’s other priorities; the new network of sanctions imposed by his predecessor on Iran; by Biden himself; and by growing opposition by Republicans and some Democrats alike to an accord that does not mask Iran’s efforts to spread its influence in the region, especially its its support for pro-Iranian groups attacking US military bases in Syria and Iraq and its burgeoning ballistic missile programs. .
Indeed, even if, by some miracle, Biden could rejoin the nuclear deal any time soon, it would likely be a political liability for a president with a rave rating. browsing is decreasing. One might be forgiven for imagining Biden’s political advisers urging him to delay any entry back into the JCPOA (at least by some in Washington).
Suffice it to say, things don’t look good as the seventh round of talks between Iran, Europe, Russia and China opens in Vienna. (Iran still refuses to meet face-to-face with the US.)
Malley, the US special envoy, hinted at such an approach in a recent BBC interview, where he suggested that if Iran overplayed its hand, the world would see that Tehran had a chance to achieve a agreement but chose not to do so.
Iran is preparing its own talking points to try and blame Washington, asking how Iran could enter into another deal without US assurances that it will not sign again. Iran will count on Russia and China to take its side in the gotcha sweepstakes.
This round of talks could initially bounce back what Iran has to offer after a five-month delay. And it is likely that neither the US, nor Iran nor Europe, Russia nor China want the talks to end. But if they do, we’ll be lucky to get away with a game of gotcha.
Alternatives to joining the JCPOA – a smaller, sanctions relief agreement to reduce Iran’s nuclear activities or a stronger, longer-term deal to extend restrictive measures restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities – seems impractical. Israel’s so-called Plan B discussed with the Biden administration – more sanctions; cyber warfare; and threatening military action against Iran’s nuclear sites – a plan Biden, preoccupied with domestic priorities, is reluctant to carry out.
This section has been updated to reflect the latest events.